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Abstract: A system is something that can be separated from its surrounds, but this definition
leaves much scope for refinement. Starting with the notion of measurement, we explore
increasingly contextual system behaviour and identify three major forms of contextuality
that might be exhibited by a system: (1) between components; (2) between system and
experimental method; and (3) between a system and its environment. Quantum theory is
shown to provide a highly useful formalism from which all three forms of contextuality
can be analysed, offering numerous tests for contextual behaviour, as well as modelling
possibilities for systems that do indeed display it. I conclude with the introduction of a
contextualised general systems theory based on an extension of this formalism.
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1. Systems Theory in a Crisis?
Systems theory has reached something of an impasse. While early work yielded a range of insights
about general system behaviour [1,2], the field has failed to live up to this early promise. Indeed, the
periodic rise and fall of interest in cybernetics, systems, complex systems and, now, complex adaptive
systems suggests that the field is hitting a barrier that it is struggling to overcome. Here, I will argue that
re-examining the notion of context can help us to progress.
We will start with a consideration of the very notion of a system. What allows us to model some
part of the world as a system, separate from its surroundings? This will lead to a discussion of the
idea of a measurement that can be performed upon a system. At this point, we shall see that only a
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very small subset of systems displays objective behaviour upon measurement. This observation allowed
entire fields to progress in their attempts to understand reality; however, the systems modelled by fields,
such as physics and chemistry, are not all there is to reality; we must be very careful as to how deeply
we hold the idea that objective responses to measurement are essential to the very idea of science. Many
systems do not display such behaviour, and it is essential that we understand the different ways in which
they can violate what might otherwise be regarded as a core tenet of science.
The attempt to understand this violation of objectivity will form the core contribution of this work. We
will consider the notion of context and the way in which contextual behaviour leads to the manifestation
of behaviour that is often denoted as complex. Contextual behaviour has been witnessed in physics, too,
and quantum theory (QT) was the result. QT has developed a whole range of formalisms to describe
contextuality, but there is no a priori reason why these cannot be used beyond the domain of physics.
Indeed, a new field of research has sprung up from the attempt to create quantum-like formalisms to
describe the behaviour of systems exhibiting contextual behaviour.
However, stepping back from this general modelling paradigm, it is possible to realise that QT did
not cease with the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. The description of structures appearing
and disappearing required a move to quantum field theory (QFT), historically through the mechanism of
second quantization, but this is not the only path available, as demonstrated by the functional methods of
QFT [3]. A more direct set of mappings should be sought in any attempt to describe complex emergent
systems, and we shall discuss the manner in which this might be achieved within the framework of a
contextualised general systems theory (CGST).
We begin with the notion of a system.
1.1. What Is a System?
At its simplest, a system S is a set of entities that are interacting via a set of relationships [4]. It is
something that we can single out from some sort of environment E and is designated as either closed or
open, depending on whether it interacts with that environment. Some fields of science have discovered
a dynamics (or set of laws) that describe their systems, but other fields have been finding it harder
to discover even the requisite underlying kinematics (or general behaviour) of their systems of interest.
Here, we shall take the notion of separability to be key to the definition of a system. Such a move is hardly
unique; indeed, both the Latin word syste¯ma, and the Greek word ςυ´στεμα have this same notion of a
set of components that form something distinct from their surrounds. This concept went on to motivate
the very notion of reduction, which is central to the basic understanding of science [5,6], and yet, many
different fields have challenged this fundamental notion of separability. Thus, we see scenarios, such
as biological systems, which display phenotypic plasticity, and, so, depend not just upon their genetic
sequences, but upon the environment in which they evolve [7,8] and the people who give responses to
questions about the length of a line, which depend upon the responses that have been given before by a
set of conspirators [9]. Even that bastion of reduction, physics, has shown what might be regarded as a
surprising tendency to throw up contradictions when we assume that reductive models of the Universe
will prove appropriate, with phenomena like entanglement/non-locality [10], colour confinement [11,12]
and collective dynamics [13], all presenting their challenges to reductive explanations.
Systems 2014, 2 543
Some examples will serve as guiding illustrations for the arguments that we will develop here.
A tennis ball is notably distinct from its environment. If we know the mass of the ball, its initial
velocity and the value of gravity, then we can easily map out the trajectory of a system such as
this (and a school student is frequently expected to do so). Indeed, the movements of objects
like this very much motivated the development of modern physics (and so our conceptualisation
of science). However, even an example as simple as this one becomes problematic upon closer
examination. Gravity changes in different places; friction becomes important (in the form of air
resistance), and even the surface of the ball can affect its trajectory. Of course, these effects are
second order, and we only care about them in the case where a highly accurate prediction about
where the ball falls becomes necessary. However, a projectile that is moving fast enough requires
an entirely new theory, General Relativity, in order to reach the accuracy required in some cases
(e.g., when we are trying to estimate where satellites will be for our global GPS infrastructure).
Thus, even in the paradigmatically simple case of projectile motion, there is no one model or
theory that universally applies.
A steam engine provides a slightly more complex example due to its internal mechanisms, which
are dependent upon thermodynamic principles. Measurements can still be performed upon such a
system, and depending upon how well it is isolated from the environment, we will see well-defined
behaviour emerge. Much of modern statistical mechanics arose from relaxing conditions about
how isolated a system is from its environment (with the formalism describing microcanonical,
canonical and grand canonical ensembles as the system becomes more open). One particularly
new aspect presents upon comparison with our original tennis ball; steam engines can exchange
material with their environments and, so, should no longer be regarded as closed. Indeed, as long
as a steady supply of combustible material is maintained, the steam engine will enter a steady state,
where the energy it produces becomes a constant (despite requiring this constant input).
Biological systems are more difficult to separate from their surrounding environment. An
organism, while distinct and following physical laws (such as the same gravitational laws affecting
the tennis ball), must interact with its environment in order to survive. It is an open system and
is generally considered to be dissipative [14] (in contrast even to systems described by the grand
canonical ensemble, which is assumed to be in equilibrium). This means that biological systems
rely in principle upon the environment to ensure their ongoing structural and functional stability,
and their models tend to make this openness more explicit than is the case for statistical mechanics.
Biological systems are also inherently contextual, with genes, species and even ecosystems capable
of exhibiting profoundly different responses to the same stimulus if it occurs within a different
context [15]. These characteristics already make the notion of a system very different in biology
compared to those that are commonly considered in physics.
Language arises within a population in a society, and so, it makes almost no sense to talk
about the notion of a system and its environment in this case. However, structurally, language is
frequently assumed to be separable, at least at the syntactic level. Indeed, a centrally held dogma in
linguistics, the principle of compositionality, states that the meanings of higher order expressions,
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such as sentences, are determined from a combination of the meanings of its constituent parts [16].
If this principle were true, then it would imply that linguistic systems can be straightforwardly
separated from their surrounding environment; however, this is very difficult to justify either
theoretically or empirically. The social nature of language implies that the meaning we attribute
to words is probabilistically modified not just by other words [17], but also by our experiences,
education, social identity, demographics and our current context. As a result, fields, such as
cognitive science, still struggle to produce models of language that incorporate well-known effects.
Societies exhibit a wide range of complex interdependencies. For example, social psychology has
developed a highly sophisticated understanding of the complexities inherent in human interactions,
with phenomena like cognitive dissonance, attitude change, prejudice, the conceptualisations of
self and identity and the formation of ideologies, all subject to intensive investigation [18]. Most
of these studies consistently reveal strong interdependencies between the system under study and
the environment. Should we draw our separating line around the people in the society? Should we
include their technology and domesticated animals? What of the way in which different societies
change their terrain (e.g., by draining swamps, deforestation, the emission of carbon, etc.).
It is difficult to find a clear dividing line between a society and its environment. Social factors
also affect the individual. For example, Asch’s line judgement task [9] shows that the context
in which people make judgements even about the length of a line can be profoundly affected by
their social context. This makes it highly difficult to draw a clean line around a social system;
even the experimentalist can have a strong influence upon a social system, with issues such as
framing [19] showing that how you ask a question can profoundly affect the result that you obtain
from a subject.
Of course, many different behaviours can be described by the tools developed in physics, which
suggests that the framework of a system plus the environment, S ⊕ E , (this is a general notation,
referring to a general system with two components; the ⊕ symbol is meant to be general, and does
not refer to a direct sum in any way) is remarkably useful. For example, Albert and Barabási [20]
have combined network theory and statistical mechanics to describe some characteristics of biological,
linguistic and social systems. However, the characteristics of the systems described by models such as
these are not particularly complex [21]; are we selecting for those behaviours that we can model using
these techniques?
1.2. General Systems
General systems theory (GST) attempts to specify a set of principles that can apply to all types of
systems [1]. Its history traces back to attempts to respond to the challenges posed by non-physical
(e.g., biological, cognitive and social) systems to our reductive techniques [2]. Indeed, von Bertalanffy’s
attempt to argue for a ‘middle way’ perspectivism between absolutism and radical relativism [2] suggests
that GST arose from an acceptance that the full set of behaviour and properties pertaining to some
objects might be difficult to describe using models that derive purely from physics. Von Bertalanffy
argued that biology needed not just empirical “facts”, but hypotheses and eventually laws of some form.
However, this raises an important problem: biological systems are inherently contextual (as are many
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cognitive and social systems), which makes many of the tools of the modern scientific method very
difficult to apply. The assumption that these systems can be described as objects, behaving objectively
(i.e., independently of the manner in which we observe them) becomes highly problematic [15,21],
and so, assumptions routinely used in physics begin to lose their validity. Separability, reduction and
independence between components increasingly find themselves questioned, and new notions become
important, including emergence, holism and downward causation [6,22–24].
However, formalising these notions has proven to be difficult. Instead of a generalised formal model,
we have seen a range of different approaches and methods proposed, especially as GST was gradually
replaced by complex systems science (CSS). Network theory, agent-based modelling, statistical models,
spin glass models and evolutionary approaches have all been applied to the modelling of systems well
beyond the physical [25,26]. However, caution is necessary. von Bertalanffy noted the difference
between “description” and “explanation”, bemoaning the fact that biology was stuck in a descriptive,
or pre-Copernican, period [2], which could provide an explanation for this wide range of models and
approaches. Are we stuck in a descriptive phase? Or do we require multiple models?
1.3. Model Complexity
The complexity required of a model depends not just upon the system to be described. The
requirements of the modeller also play a role.
Even for the case of the tennis ball, we saw that varying levels of model complexity were possible.
However, in that case, it was possible to choose between them according to the accuracy required of the
model. This is because tennis balls exhibit a clear boundary separating the ball from its environment,
which means that it is only necessary to consider those factors in the environment that are required for an
accurate enough description of its dynamics. This relatively straightforward scenario can be contrasted
with other systems that do not display such a clear separation. In particular, it is frequently the case that
different levels of description are possible within the one system. Thus, in the case of an ecosystem, we
see that:
Depending on the spatiotemporal scale or window through which one is viewing the world,
a forest stand may appear (1) as a dynamic entity in its own right, (2) as a constant
(i.e., nondynamic) background within which an organism operates, or (3) as inconsequential
noise in major geomorphological processes. (O’Neill et al. [27], p. 83)
Of course, this emphasis on levels of description is by no means new. For example, in
cognitive science, Marr proposed that three complementary levels of analysis should be used to
understand information processing systems: (i) computational; (ii) representational and algorithmic; and
(iii) implementational [28]. These levels can respectively be understood as the function, procedures and
physical mechanisms of the cognitive system [29]. In both Marr’s approach to understanding information
and the scenario described by O’Neill et al. [27], we see that the scale used to model the forest
stand depends upon the requirements of the modeller. Is a botanical, zoological or geological model
required for the forest stand? Alternatively, are we seeking a algorithmic, functional or hardware-driven
model of cognition? Different modellers are interested in different aspects, or perspectives, of
the same system [29]. Indeed, this form of argument can be traced back to at least Aristotle’s
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four classifications of cause: material, formal, efficient and final [24], each describing different causal
categories that can be used in the explanation of some general thing (be it object, relation, law, etc.).
Such levels of description pose a challenge to the more standard definitions of complexity, which often
list a series of properties that are displayed by complex systems. For example, Mitchell [25] suggests
that complex systems must exhibit: (i) complex collective behaviour; (ii) signalling and information
processing; and (iii) adaptation. While this is by no means a poor definition, it fails to acknowledge the
contextuality of the very definition of a system as complex. Returning to the forest stand example above,
these characteristics are only exhibited when it is the forest itself that is under study. In a larger scale
model (say of an ecosystem, which is usually also regarded as complex by this kind of a definition),
the complexity of the forest stand often disappears, to be replaced by a very simple model. Thus, for
the system under examination by O’Neill et al. [27], the forest stand is modelled as a simple random
noise term in comparison to major geomorphological processes and by a constant factor when it is
the species living inside the forest under consideration. Neither of these models would be considered
complex according to the definition of Mitchell [25]. If the forest were something that we had never been
interested in, then we would never have thought to designate it as complex. Therefore, while more is no
doubt different [30], it seems inappropriate to designate a system as either simple or complex without
consideration of the level at which it is to be understood. Indeed:
The way we look determines what we see, or rather it co-determines the latter, in conjunction
with what there is. (Kampis [31], p. 95)
But this raises an interesting question; how are we to analyse such contextual complexity?
For many systems, the decision as to which level of description should be adopted depends upon the
observer, who is required to make an epistemic cut between the system and the environment [32]. There
are very few systems with a natural cut, and historically, most of them were found in physics, which
appears to have a very special status in modelling. Thus, many of our approaches to modelling (and our
associated assumptions) have been derived from a field in which such separations are generally assumed
to be possible (and historically have been). However, even in physics, assumptions of noncontextuality
and separability have become problematic. It is often the case that in examining complex systems, we
are far more than passive observers. Yet, we have very few theoretical tools that can represent such
behaviour.
However, our understanding of the role of the observer suggests that understanding measurement is
key to understanding contextuality. For this reason, we shall now turn to a consideration of measurement.
In what follows, we shall gradually increase the contextuality of the behaviour revealed by measurement,
asking what this tells us about the formalism required to understand and model the resulting behaviour.
2. Measuring General Systems
In order to describe measurement, we will have to enlarge our notion of a system. Measurements
form a boundary between the system and the environment (in which the observer traditionally resides).
Introducing both the observer O and a measuring device D leaves us with the more specific system
shown in Figure 1, one that it is possible to experimentally probe and investigate.
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Figure 1. At its simplest, a system S is something that can be considered as distinct from its
environment E in some manner. Some systems can be measured by a deviceD that discovers
information about the state of the system and reports it to an observer O, who resides in the
environment.
S
E
D O
The classical ball, moving according to the laws of Newtonian physics, must hit a device of some
form to be measured. This could be a wall, a basketball hoop, a net, a tennis racket, etc., but will
inevitably require an interaction between the system and the device. While the ball has a well-defined
position before measurement (which could be extracted using visual observation), this does not count as
a measurement due to the way in which perceptual stimuli can be easily misjudged in scenarios of bias.
Nonetheless, it is possible to straightforwardly assume that the ball has a position before it is measured
and that the measurement merely finds out what it was (in an objective manner, as photons reflected from
the ball are incident on the eye). Measurement merely records reality; it does not influence what is found
during that measurement.
Such assumptions, while sometimes correct, can be markedly dangerous. For example, assuming that
a photon can be described in the same way as the tennis ball results in surprise. Consider, for example,
the modern quantum version of the Young’s double slit experiment, which reveals interference patterns
even when single electrons are sent into the apparatus [33], unless a measurement is performed at one of
the slits to find out which way it went (in which case, a diffusion pattern results).
Further afield, the concept of a ‘gene’ in biology has moved from protein coding sequences to a
more modern understanding that genes are comprised of many interdependent elements and that this
makes it very difficult to delimit even the boundaries of a gene. Even when classically conceived, it is
not clear where the boundary between selective units and their environments lie. A gene is subject to
its environment, but this includes not only its cellular and extracellular environment; other genes and
regulatory elements, homologues, etc., are also important. Increasingly, we see the notion of functional
genetic units expanding to include network modules, rather than just genes [34].
Similarly, in psychology and sociology, we find that the way we ask questions inevitably affects the
response that we obtain. For example, framing a question in a positive or negative light can result in
statistically significant preference changes, even if the same question is being asked [19].
Systems, such as these, pose problems for any theory that assumes that a system ‘has’ objectively
defined properties, without reference to the context in which these occur (which could be a measurement
scenario, an environment, another confounding measurement, etc.). Thus, an organism does not have a
phenotype without reference to its environment, and a wide range of experimental data shows that it is
highly problematic to assume that attitudes, opinions, affect and decisions can be measured objectively
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(i.e., without reference to the social context in which they occur). This contextuality presents many
problems for the modeller. A context cannot be something that is within the system (S); rather, it
is beyond the thing that was originally designated as interesting. Conversely, a context is somehow
interesting in its own right; it is not something that should be relegated to an environment (and, by
implication, deemed uninteresting). However, this leaves us in an awkward position: what is a context
precisely? This question is not one that has been satisfactorily answered from a systems perspective.
The factors that have been termed a ‘context’ are more diverse than the fields that utilise the term.
Sometimes, a context is a location (e.g., in mobile technologies); sometimes, it is a set of parameters (e.g.,
when a context is stored during a task interruption), and a context might indicate how much information
is assumed by the members of a culture (in anthropology) or the words that influence the semantic
association a subject gives to another word (in linguistics). This list is by no means exhaustive. Context
appears to be a grab bag term, used to denote something that is interesting, but not really a part of the
originally envisaged system.
This variety of different uses often results in category errors. Much of what we call contextual can
be reduced to an extra parameter in a model (e.g., the location of a mobile device). Such data exist out
there; we do not know this, but these have a well-defined value. This calls into question the original
designation of such a factor as contextual. If this data were relevant to the description of the system of
interest, then we have drawn our boundary incorrectly (in this case, around the mobile phone, opting for
a model that is primarily influenced by the boundaries of objects, instead of the more abstract model that
described the object in a location). Note that the biotic system that is placed in a different environment is
not of the same form. It is impossible to be sure what form the phenotype will have as it depends upon an
interaction between the system and the environment, and here, we find an important clue. Contextuality
must be ontological. That is, it must refer to fundamental uncertainty that is displayed by the system
once a level of analysis has been designated.
Very few tools have been developed for the description of contextual behaviour. This problem is
compounded when we consider the manner in which this behaviour manifests; it is often the case that
our very attempts to measure, model or interact with a contextually-dependent system result in a change
to the very results obtained from our measurements of that system (not just its future dynamics). Consider
the way in which the assumption that the global financial market was crash-free led to the Black–Scholes
model, which itself precipitated the 1987 stock market crash [35]. Here, we see a situation where the
model adopted to describe a system affected its very dynamics, i.e., in incorrectly assuming that the
economy was separate from the scientific process of its analysis and description, the very model created
to describe the dynamics of the stock market became responsible for a change in its dynamics.
There appear to be a number of different classes of contextuality that might be displayed by a system
of interest. We might initially expect that different effects would result from contextual responses:
(1) Between components where the responses of one component will depend upon the input from
other components of the system: Consider, for example, the genetic pathways that can be identified
in different cellular responses to stimuli [36]. These depend very heavily upon the prior activation
of the different genes involved; the same response will not always be exhibited in response to what
appeared to be the same input. In a different context, very different results might occur. As this
is a dependency that arises within the traditional boundaries of a system, there are already many
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techniques that can be utilised to analyse this form of contextuality. Indeed, many complex system
approaches, such as network models [34,37] and agent-based modelling (ABM) [38,39], already
provide a useful framework for the investigation of such inter-component dependencies, although
more work will obviously be necessary to develop a full understanding of them [40].
(2) Between system and experimental method, where our theories are consistently failing [21,41]:
As an extreme example, we can consider the problems of framework and subjectivity that often
beset social scientists; how they look at social systems often determines the results that they
obtain [42]. However, we might also consider the complexities inherent in scientifically describing
economic responses [35], social interactions [43], psychological diagnoses and outcomes [44],
as well as our understanding of language, semantics and meaning [45]. Many complex systems
display highly contextual responses to the method used to analyse them, and this has hindered their
description by scientific approaches. Indeed, there are very few formalisms capable of describing
such experimental contextuality.
(3) Between system and environment context can result in profound effects: One classic example
is provided by the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity, where two organisms with identical
genotypes can yield phenotypes so different in two different environments that they are identified
as different species [46]. Indeed, theoretical biology could be identified as one of the key
areas in which GST developed a wide range of models that sought to understand environmental
contextuality (e.g., [1,24,47,48]).
These different contextual responses may require different modelling methodologies, but it might also
be possible to generalise our understanding of context from a proper consideration of their similarities.
While contextual dependencies between components are the focus of much current complex systems
science (CSS) research, less work looks at contextual dependencies of Types (2) and (3). Given
the apparent prevalence of contextually-dependent complex systems in our modern world, one might
wonder at the apparent lack of theories capable of modelling such behaviour. One way forward would
involve taking contextuality seriously. Intriguingly, one formalism already exists that takes contextuality
between a system and experimental method very seriously: quantum theory.
3. Contextuality in Quantum Systems
Context matters in the formalism of quantum theory (QT). From von Neumann’s measurement theory
and the Heisenberg uncertainty relations [49], to the Bell and Kochen–Specker theorems [49,50], the
context of a quantum system plays a vital role in the results we obtain when we try to measure its
properties and behaviour.
This implicit recognition of context in standard quantum measurement theory can be quickly
demonstrated. According to the formalism (see below for more details), the probability of some
measurement outcome can be extracted by representing the state of the system (|ψ〉) with respect to
some measurement context. Thus, in Figure 2, we see a simple measurement of a system that answers
a basic yes/no question (e.g., did the particle go up or down when we measured its spin). We represent
this scenario using a measurement context c, which consists of a subspace in which the state |ψ〉 can
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be embedded. We use an orthonormal basis {|1〉c, |0〉c} to model this subspace, where the two vectors
|1〉c and |0〉c are used to represent the measurement of yes or no in the context c. QT predicts that the
probability of recording a yes to our question in context c is equal to the square of the projection of |ψ〉c
onto the |1〉c state, and the probability of recording a no is equal to the square of the projection of |ψ〉
onto the |0〉c state.
Figure 2. A state |ψ〉 is represented by the quantum formalism within a context. For this
simple illustrative example, we see the state represented within a context c, which is drawn in
a two-dimensional space, spanned by the basis {|1〉c, |0〉c}. This context could represent the
probability of a yes (P (yesc) = |a1|2) or a no (P (noc) = |a0|2) result being recorded upon
the measurement represented by c. Changing the context of the system can be represented by
rotating the basis and would lead to different projections of the state onto that new context.
This is a geometrical account of probability, given by a straightforward application of Pythagoras
theorem [49]. The result is a remarkably different understanding of probability when compared to the
more standard epistemological approaches, which take probability as arising due to a lack of information
(i.e., knowing too little about what a state of affairs actually is). A geometrical account of probability
allows for a particularly natural representation of how a system might respond to a change in context
(when a state of affairs becomes ontologically different). Thus, a rotation of the {|1〉c, |0〉c} basis could
represent a different context (e.g., rotating the spin measurement apparatus), and different probabilities
would result.
This intuition can be formalised, as follows. First, |ψ〉 is written in terms of a set of basis states, {|φi〉}.
This representation of |ψ〉 is obtained by expanding it as a linear superposition (i.e., an appropriately
weighted sum) of one set of basis states (commonly obtained in practice through reference to the choice
of apparatus and its orientation, state, etc., and written as an orthonormal basis, although this is by no
means essential). We find that |ψ〉 = ∑i ci|φi〉, where the weight terms ci represent the contribution
of each component (|φi〉) of the basis to the actual state. The choice of basis states is governed by the
observable to be measured and the quantization procedure that relates each observable, A, to its quantum
counterpart, A [49,51]. Perhaps most importantly, the standard interpretation of quantum theory claims
that upon measurement, the quantum system is found to ‘collapse’ onto one of the eigenstates associated
with the eigenvalue equation A|ψ〉 = λi|ψ〉. Hence, upon measurement, a non-linear outcome occurs
due to this process of collapse, which is related to both the state of the system and to the context of that
system (as it is represented by the observable). Further experiments will then be performed upon this
newly collapsed state, and so, later measurements will also be affected. We see that the probabilities of
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QT arise not from a lack of details (as is the case for standard Kolmogorovian probabilities), but rather
from the geometrical representation of a state that is implied by Q’Ts formal recognition of context in
the process of measurement [49].
This simple approach to the modelling of measurement means that the quantum formalism
incorporates the experimental context of a system into its description of that system, and this context
can profoundly affect the experimental result obtained. Thus, QT can describe the system contextuality
of Type (2). This is a highly unusual state of affairs in scientific modelling, which almost by definition
assumes that a system of interest can be separated from the models that are used to analyse its behaviour.
The generalisation of QT beyond the physical realm would make it possible to model similar
contextual effects in systems not presently well modelled by the scientific method. Indeed, this
process has begun already; quantum inspired models have already been used to model a wide range
of non-physical systems [52,53], including: decision making [54–58], attitude change [59], language
and memory [60–63], biology [15,64–66], creativity and cultural evolution [67,68], vision [69],
economics [70,71] and information retrieval [72–74], to name just a few examples.
3.1. Non-Separability and Openness in Quantum Models
In addition to this immediate application to the description of contextual measurements, the
phenomenon of entanglement [49,51,75] allows us to extend the quantum formalism to the description
of systems exhibiting contextual dependency of Type (1). If we consider two components SA and SB
of a system S, then a contextual dependency between the two implies that it is not possible to consider
them separately. The quantum formalism provides a very clear description of this state of affairs. If we
denote the states of the two components by |ψA〉 and |ψB〉, then a separable combined system, |ψA⊕B〉,
will be one that can be decomposed using a tensor product: |ψA⊕B〉 = |ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉 (Here, and in what
follows, we will use a standard formalism where⊕ is used to denote the combination of two systems via
a general operator, i.e., it is not necessarily an addition operation, whereas ⊗ denotes the specifics of a
tensor product, which can be used to model this combination when the system is technically separable).
In contrast, a system for which the components cannot be considered independently is represented in
the quantum formalism using an entangled state. Thus, if, for example, component SA always exhibits
response a when SB does and response b when SB does, then we might represent the combined system
as |ψA⊕B〉 = N1|aa〉 + N2|bb〉, where N1 and N2 take the role of some normalisation factor (i.e.,
N 21 + N 22 = 1). If such a state is impossible to represent as a tensor product, then it is deemed
non-separable and termed entangled. Entangled states are responsible for many of the counter-intuitive
results of QT [75], but most interesting to the current argument, they exhibit contextual responses to
measurement [76,77], where they play an essential role. According to the standard interpretation of QT,
a measuring device must first become entangled with the system of interest before collapse occurs and a
result is obtained [49]. This suggests that systems of Types (1) and (2), in fact, share the same dynamics.
Finally, contextual dependencies of Type (3) can sometimes be modelled using dissipative, or open,
quantum models [78,79]. These systems are subject to ongoing interaction with their surroundings
(which, at a first approximation, can be treated as a measurement), and so, the complexity of their
dynamics increases substantially. While some work has been completed that uses this formalism in
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quantum-like models (e.g., [58,66]), this is a new and fast developing field. Open quantum systems
are made even more interesting by the way in which they are often related to ontological models of
emergence. For example, Vitiello has modelled the contextuality of memory using an open quantum
model [13]. As many complex systems are generally open to environmental influences, this is an area
that is likely to become the focus of much future work.
Thus, we see that the three forms of contextuality introduced in Section 2 can be accommodated
within a consistent set of models inspired by the quantum formalism. What more specific tools does QT
provide? Could these be used in a contextualised general systems theory?
3.2. Tests for Contextuality
There are a wide range of contextuality effects in QT. In this section, we will start with a class
of tests that can be used on systems with one component and then gradually increase the system
complexity, by adding more components, and the possibility of interactions between those components.
We shall see that QT has provided an entire class of tests that can be used to determine the validity
of the assumption that a system is non-contextual. Violations of the Law of Total Probability, Bell’s
theorem, the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt theorem, the Kochen–Specker theorem and Fine’s theorems
all generate strong restrictions on the possible form that a separable system can have, and their violation
frequently entails contextual behaviour. Here, we shall only explore some of the more accessible
examples. The interested reader is encouraged to consult the many different references cited here and
elsewhere for further details.
3.2.1. Context in Measurement
Quantum measurements are frequently shown to behave in a contextual manner using a violation of
the Law of Total Probability as a test [52].
For example, Busemeyer et al. [54] resolve the well-known Linda problem, which arises from
applying the standard conjunction rule of probability to human reasoning. This rule tells us that the
probability of some event A occurring in conjunction with a specific event Xj is smaller than that of the
same event occurring in conjunction with a more general event
∑
j Xj:
P (AX) =
∑
j
P (AXj)⇒ P (AX) ≥ P (AXj) ∀j (1)
This basic law of probability is frequently violated by humans across a wide range of demographics
(including educational ones). Such violations are commonly generated via a story that proceeds
something like the following:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy.
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable?
1. Linda is a bank teller.
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
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A large majority of people (85% in the original case presented by Tversky and Kahneman [80])
choose the second option, thus making statements that are more specific than necessary (e.g., P (AX) <
P (AXj)), hence less likely according to standard probability. We see that the preceding story is affecting
the way in which people reason probabilistically about Linda. This violation of the conjunction rule
is well explained by a quantum model, which uses projections in geometric spaces and interference
between different framings of a problem to explain how the context in which human subjects form a
model of ‘Linda’ is affected by the context of the preceding story. This model is used to explain a wide
range of effects traditionally considered disparate in psychology and cognitive science, including the
disjunction fallacy and the hot hand fallacy [52,54,55,81,82]. The standard approach followed in these
scenarios involves finding a dataset where the Law of Total Probability is violated and then fitting the
data with quantum interference terms, which adjust the probabilities in the model to fit the experimental
results (see e.g., Busemeyer and Bruza [52] for a general introduction).
It might be claimed that this form of contextuality is not particularly interesting; the context of a
stimulus is affecting a behavioural response (i.e., the decision of a subject about Linda’s status), which
would be expected by any researcher in a field such as psychology. However, the quantum formalism
offers a methodology that shows promise for describing a wide range of contextual effects within a
unified formalism, rather than an ad hoc and incremental set of approaches. More examples as we
continue will help to demonstrate this potential.
Another form of contextuality upon measurement is exhibited by systems that display order effects
(meaning that the order in which two measurements are performed affects the outcome). Wang and
Busemeyer [83] discuss a number of well-known scenarios, unifying them in an approach based upon
quantum probability. For example, Moore [84] showed that asking subjects about the trustworthiness
of Bill Clinton and then Al Gore reduced Gore’s rating (down to 60% from a value of 68%, obtained
when Gore was rated first). That is, in the comparative context of Clinton, Gore seems less trustworthy.
Clinton was similarly rated as more trustworthy when subjects were asked to rate Gore first (57% from a
non-comparative result of 50%). This effect was modelled by Wang and Busemeyer [83] using projection
operators to represent the probability of responding yes to Question A (e.g., “Is Al Gore trustworthy?”)
asPAy (similarly, that of responding no to A asPAn). Asking one question is seen to project the cognitive
state into a subspace, which then changes the probabilities of a subject answering yes to Question B (as
was discussed above for the general model). Wang and Busemeyer [83] use the formalism of QT to
define an equality that must be satisfied by any system exhibiting pure quantum behaviour, the q-test:
q = PAB − PBA = 0 (2)
where PAB = P (AyBn) + P (AnBy) and PBA = P (ByAn) + P (BnAy), which are two probabilities
referring to the probability of having different answers to two questions (A and B) in the orders AB
and BA, respectively. They use this test to explain the results reported in Moore [84], thus unifying the
violation of the LTPdiscussed above, with that of order effects in psychology.
A further experiment, discussed by White et al. [85] demonstrates that the constructive role of
measurement is likely to be causing the change in probabilities that arise in these scenarios. This
paper introduces a very simple paradigm, where subjects are exposed to two images in a row, with
half of the subjects asked to articulate their impressions about the first image before being shown the
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second and all subjects asked to articulate their impressions about the second image. This experiment
shows that even a slight modification in the instructions given to a subject can have a significant impact
upon their response, even keeping all other factors constant (in this case, order and images). Such a
modification is most naturally treated as a context if we take the geometric model discussed above.
Asking a subject to express their impression about the first image effectively performs a measurement on
that subject’s cognitive state, and this, in turn, modifies their state. The next measurement is performed
upon a different system.
This section has discussed a number of different types of context, along with a consistent model
that can be used to describe them. Furthermore, this model provides natural tests that can be used to
determine whether contextuality is being displayed by the system under consideration or not. However,
this is only a first step towards what we might call a contextualised generalised systems theory. A second
set of models and tests come from the quantum formalism when it is applied to systems that consist of
multi-component states. These tests can be used to discover whether the system should be considered
using a reductive model or not, and while they are related to the tests and models discussed in this section
(as they still involve measurement), they add to the formalism by providing further information about
the internal behaviour of the system (i.e., between the components).
3.2.2. Bell-Type Theorems
What happens when we combine two component systems into one joint system? The quantum
formalism has a well-developed mechanism for combining systems, using the tensor product and time
evolution operations [49]. However, once two originally separate systems interact, can we still model
them as separable systems? QT has provided a highly sophisticated toolkit for considering questions
such as these.
Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical system S, in an environment E , which consists of two components SA
and SB that were originally separate (or that we have perhaps imagined could be separated), but have
since interacted. There are many questions that can be asked about this system: can SA and SB still be
regarded as separate or do they somehow influence one another? Would a consideration of the combined
system SA ⊕ SB ⊕ E give the same specification of behaviour as S ⊕ E? What components of this
system exhibit causal interdependencies? QT allows us to move such questions from what are largely
philosophical discussions into the experimental realm.
While it is generally assumed that systems are by definition separable in a well-defined manner
from their environments, a similar separation between SA and SB is not something that can
be straightforwardly achieved in QT, even when there is no apparent causal connection between
the two components.
For example, suppose that two different experiments can be carried out upon each of the presumed
subsystems, which will answer a set of ‘questions’ with binary outcomes. We shall represent these
questions using four possible measurement settings, consisting of two alternative questions asked
of either sub-component. Thus, a choice of two experimental settings a or a′ can be applied to
sub-component SA, and similarly, b or b′ can be applied to sub-componentB. Each of these experimental
questions lead to a binary outcome (e.g., a detector clicks or it does not), which represents either a ‘yes’
or a ‘no’ answer to the question asked of the system. For the sake of generality, we shall denote these
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responses as +1 or zero, respectively; they form a set of random variables that we shall label asA,A′,B
and B′. It is now possible to consider the notion of the probability distribution over these outcomes;
what characteristics will be possessed by the random variables describing this system?
Figure 3. A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed sub-components
SA = |ψA〉 and SB = |ψB〉. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive
choice of experiments upon those sub-components. Two alternative experimental settings
probe either proposed sub-component, represented by a or a′ for sub-component SA and
b, b′ for sub-component SB. Each of these experimental settings corresponds to a context
ca, ca′ , cb, cb′ , which is used to represent the sub-system (and sometimes the system, as well)
in that context, using the formalism introduced in Figure 2.
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments will have a statistical distribution over all
available outcomes, and this can be used to determine whether the sub-components can be considered as
isolated, influencing one another or in some sense irreducible. Frequently, joint probability distributions,
such as P (A,A′,B,B′), are used to model the behaviour of systems like that represented in Figure 3;
however, it has been shown that this joint probability does not exist for certain quantum [75,86] and
psychological systems [17,52,87]. When such behaviour is evident, we have clear reason to suppose
that the system under examination is contextual; experiments performed upon sub-system SB affect
the results of experiments performed upon sub-system SA, even though the two sub-systems were
presumed independent. Thus, the context of sub-system SA, as represented by sub-system SA, can
have a well-defined influence upon its behaviour, which is not causal in any of the more traditional
understandings.
It is possible to derive a number of restrictions on the probability distributions that must
be satisfied by a separable system. For example, we could define such a system as one
for which experiments performed at SA will not affect those performed at SB and vice versa.
More specifically, a person committed to reductive modelling would normally assume that the
result of running experiments a or a′ does not depend upon the experimental settings used on
subsystem SB (i.e., b or b′) and that the results of experimentally interacting with subsystem
SB do not depend upon the experimental settings applied to SA (i.e., a or a′). It is possible to
construct a joint probability describing this state of affairs and how it might depend upon a set
of hidden parameters, or latent variables, denoted λ, which is assumed to have a normalised
Systems 2014, 2 556
probability distribution ρ :
∫
dλρ(λ) = 1. The joint probability for experimental arrangement
a, b becomes:
P (a, b) =
∫
dλρ(λ)A(a, λ)B(b, λ) (3)
and a similar set of relationships can be constructed for all experimental arrangements. Simple algebra
allows us to form a number of inequalities that result from this assumption. For example, we can derive
the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) inequality [88], which has become somewhat notorious in
the field of quantum physics:
|P (a, b)− P (a, b′)|+ |P (a′, b′) + P (a′, b)| ≤ 2 (4)
This is a very general statement about the possibility of separating a system into objective components
that interact only via the proposed variable λ. If this inequality is violated, then this separation is
impossible. It is worth emphasising the generality of this result. While it was originally obtained in
the field of quantum theory, the derivation of Equation (4) makes no assumptions as to the nature of
the system that is modelled by the probabilistic framework that it proposes, merely as to the potential
separability of S.
This class of tests and their more advanced forms have been applied to both language [17,89,90] and
biological systems [15]. It has also been shown to have a close connection with the notion of selective
influences in psychology [87]. We see that very clear tests can be constructed to determine whether
two apparently separate systems can indeed be modelled reductively, or not.
There are a number of extensions of this test. Many of them either use multi-partite systems or
describe two-partite systems with a larger number of operators [50,75,91–93]. Many of these extensions
allow for the construction of direct counterfactual scenarios, where if a particular experimental outcome
is realised, then a separable model of the system becomes impossible. The Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger
(GHZ) [92] and Hardy constructions [94], as well as the Kochen–Specker theorem [50,95] would provide
very strong additional tests about non-separability if they could be adapted and generalised beyond
standard QT. While such tests are yet to be realised in a quantum-like model they provide a potentially
fruitful avenue for future work.
3.3. Quantum Models of Emergence
Standard QT (or quantum mechanics) does not describe the emergence of novelty. Indeed, physicists
found it necessary to extend the formalism of QT with quantum field theory (QFT) when they started
to model situations, such as the creation and annihilation of particles within physics. In contrast to
standard QT, which preserves the number of particles in a system and, hence, cannot describe the
complex interactions occurring in much of the physical world (such as, for example, the behaviour
of atomic nuclei), QFT allows for the description of a number of inequivalent representations of the
same physical system [13]. This means that a QFT can model systems with many different ground states
(lowest energy states), a far more natural state of affairs for complex systems, as these often have a range
of stable configurations. If a QFT exhibits spontaneous symmetry breaking, meaning that the symmetry
of the dynamics of the system is different from that of the ground state, then collective excitations can
arise (termed Nambu–Goldstone modes [79,96]), corresponding to the number of broken symmetries.
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These modes are massless and, hence, long range, which means that information can be transmitted very
efficiently in such theories. It is also possible to construct dissipative QFTs, which take into account the
generally open nature of a complex system and have the added benefit of providing an essentially infinite
capacity for the system. Thus, in Vitiello’s QFT brain model [13], the memory capacity of the brain is
practically infinite due to the openness of our interactions with the world; there is an inexhaustible supply
of different stable memory states and a way of changing from one to the other in time.
While those approaches that use standard QT are modelling the context of the system in terms of
different observations, it seems likely that QFT can provide science with a genuine theory of ontological
emergence [21,41,41]. While a general theory is yet to be developed, initially promising results have
been found describing the brain [13], stock market dynamics [71], conceptual combination [97] and
differentiation [15,21].
Stepping back, it is necessary to briefly consider where exactly a quantum field theoretic model of
ontological emergence could fit into the larger understanding of emergence and into systems theory as a
whole. One overarching understanding is provided by Atmanspacher [6], who identifies four classes of
relations between two levels in a system exhibiting emergent behaviour. Each of these classes lead to very
different expectations of emergence, as they arise from a different understanding of how the description
of features at one level of a system relate to those at a higher level. Thus: (i) if the description at the
low level is necessary and sufficient for a complete understanding at the higher level, then the system
is reductive (implying no emergence at all); (ii) if the low level is neither necessary nor sufficient for
description at the higher level, then there are no relevant conditions for connecting the two levels (this
is termed radical emergence). The two more interesting categories come from dropping one of the two
sufficiency criteria: Atmanspacher [6] claims that: (iii) supervenience results from the dropping of the
necessary condition; and (iv) contextual emergence as resultant from dropping the sufficiency condition.
Thus, in the description of a contextually emergent system, ontological emergence can occur, but a model
that refers only to the lower level will not prove sufficient for describing the dynamics of the system at
the higher level. Contextual systems that require an epistemic cut will fall into this class of contextually
emergent systems, as they require extra information beyond that of the original system to be incorporated
into a model that captures their full behaviour.
This brings us to our final discussion: how do all of the concepts that we have discussed so far fit
together into an overarching framework that could drive a new contextualised general systems theory?
4. Towards a General Theory
At the beginning of this discussion, we started by examining the notion of a system. We saw that while
a system in an environment is easy to imagine, the reality is not so simple. We quickly found examples
of systems that exhibit a variety of contextual responses to measurement and their environment, which
makes it markedly difficult to draw a clean line between the system and the environment. Many of these
systems are termed complex; however, the designation of a system as complex often depends upon what
aspect of it we are interested in modelling; it is necessary to specify the level of description before we can
make statements as to a system’s complexity. We then sought to examine the manner in which system
contextuality affects measurement results, and the advantage of the quantum formalism became apparent.
Systems 2014, 2 558
It is a formalism that recognises the manner in which our interactions with a contextually-dependent
system will affect the results of measurements that we perform upon it. The geometric probabilities
used in QT link experimental manipulations made by an observer with the behaviour exhibited by
the system, which provides an invaluable modelling tool. A number of different proposals have
been made as to why QT should be used to model systems that are not traditionally deemed
physical (see e.g., [13,15,52,53,98,99]). Here, I have attempted to show that QT provides us with a
methodology that can consistently approach the notion of contextuality, between any combination of
system components, experiments and environments. QT thus provides a possibility for unifying our
understanding of a number of hitherto disparate contextuality effects, across a wide range of fields.
Of course, such an understanding requires much more work before it can be considered as complete;
an ongoing program of research is required.
One particularly important clarification will require a much more sophisticated understanding of
quantum operators for non-physical systems. QT arose in physics only after a notion of classical
measurement was defined. This meant that a dynamics had been defined classically, which mapped
naturally into QT via Hamiltonians, energy, Pauli matrices, etc. Each one of these concepts have a
well-defined meaning in physics, but this is much more difficult to discern in the quantum-like world
(i.e., beyond physics). This makes many powerful analytical techniques inaccessible to the field, at
least for now. For example, it is very difficult to understand how a quantum-like system will evolve in
time without a Hamiltonian. While dynamics can perhaps be reverse engineered (say by performing the
same measurement over a series of time steps), the very contextuality of these systems makes it hard to
know what is causing changes in experimental results. It seems likely that many quantum-like systems
will not be modelled via the standard physical technique of quantization (where a classical system
is identified and the operators are then subject to a well-defined procedure that results in a quantum
system). Quantum-like systems are being modelled by the quantum formalism precisely because they
never exhibited non-contextual behaviour, but this makes it very difficult to develop even a quantum
formalism for these systems.
Referring to Figure 4, this would imply that we need a procedure for following Mapping (4) directly
(i.e., skipping the measurement to first quantization paths). This is a difficult proposition, and it is made
more difficult when we consider the manner in which systems of Type (3) are likely to be modelled
most productively by following Path (5), which would require moving directly from acknowledging
that a system exits to the recognition that it has open boundaries and is exhibiting emergent behaviour.
We need new techniques. These would provide a direct map from the identification of a system to follow
either:
Path (4): A contextual model of its behaviour that did not require the construction of a classical
model that was then subject to quantization (currently only understood via the alternate Paths
(1)→(2) route).
Path (5): A contextual model of emergent behaviour that also left out the second quantization
option.
If direct paths could be found, then they would allow for models of contextual systems to be
constructed without following the standard reductive modelling methodology, where we assume a set
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of objects and then gradually relax our assumptions about their behaviour (through first and second
quantization).
Figure 4. A contextual general systems theory would explain all of the relationships between
the below four types of systems. Importantly, it would provide natural explanations of how
Paths (4) and (5) could be followed without assuming a classical (i.e., non-contextual) model
at the outset.
E
S
E
S
E
D
S
E
(5) Contextual Emergent Systems
(3) Second Quantization
(2) First Quantization
(1) Measurement
(4) Contextual Systems
SSA SB
a
a′
b
b′
One extant theory almost follows Path (5). Modern path integral forms of quantum field
theory [96,100] proceed by identifying a system and then modelling correlations between two points
(which can correspond to experimental settings). Thus, modern QFT proceeds directly to the description
of contextual emergent systems, from the identification of a classical dynamics. Essential to this move
is the identification of a set of groups and symmetries. Similarly, even following Path (4) requires
the identification of a group structure for the description of both time evolution and certain associated
measurements (e.g., spin in standard QT). However, this is no easy challenge. There is no guarantee that
the systems of biology, cognition or society will follow the same symmetries as those of physics. Indeed,
it is quite likely that they will prove to be far more complex.
It is worth noting that the schema proposed here is not a hierarchy of theories (such as the one
proposed by Marr; see Section 1.3) or the varying approaches to understanding emergence. Rather,
Figure 4 is a set of relationships between different conceptualisations of a system. Different systems will
be most naturally modelled at different positions in this diagram, but the relationships show us what kind
of an effort would be involved in ‘scaling up’ the complexity away from the simple S ⊕ E assumption.
It also goes some way towards demonstrating what types of behaviours would need to be exhibited by a
system at the level of analysis that we had chosen for it before such a move became necessary.
5. Conclusions
Formalising the notion of context is not impossible, but it will require sophisticated new mathematical
techniques. It also requires a thorough re-examination of the assumptions that we make when attempting
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a scientific explanation. The fact that a system does not display objective responses to measurement need
not imply that it is beyond the realms of science; QT provides a direct counterexample, and much can be
learned from a careful consideration of the system of techniques that make up this approach.
Here, I have attempted to show that a unified approach to contextuality is possible. Taking inspiration
from the quantum formalism, we can start to understand many different types of contextual systems.
We can also start to utilise a range of tests that can be used to determine whether a system is contextual,
and a formalism that can help us to model its behaviour if it is. While I hope that the ideas discussed in
this paper have sketched out a range of possibilities, much work remains to be done. However, it seems
like a contextualised general systems theory is possible and not too far away on the horizon.
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